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1 Introduction
Capitalists are grabbing a rising share of national income at the expense of
workers1 .
This comes not from a socialist tract, but the Economist magazine. Indeed,
Figure 1 shows that labors share in value added (the ip side of the prot
share) has been falling across the business sector of OECD countries for about
two decades. This is surprising as the stability of labors share has been labelled
a stylized fact of growth2 . The Economist attributes these changes to global-
ization (see also IMF, 2007, Chapter 5) as trade with less developed countries
such as India and China have led to a large increase in the global supply of
labor. But, as we show below, the decline of the labor share has also taken
place within the non-traded sectors of the economy. Trade can a¤ect equilib-
rium wages across the whole economy, of course, but this is the reason it is very
di¢ cult to identify the e¤ects of trade from other country-wide inuences. Fur-
thermore, as we show theoretically and empirically below, an increase in product
market competition due to globalization would actually tend to increase labors
share. The purpose of this paper is to investigate one other possible cause of the
declining labour share, specically that the incentives of senior managers have
shifted towards maximizing shareholder value and away from other objectives
(such as job protection or empire building). We look at the impact of priva-
tization as a key mechanism that has shifted these incentives and test this on a
panel of networkindustries across countries that have experienced signicant
shifts in the inuence of the state.
We discuss a simple model where the manager of an organization cares not
only for prots, but also about the number of employees under him. This may
1Breaking RecordsThe Economist February 12th 2005.
2This concept was introduced by David Ricardo in 1821. More recently, Blanchard (1997),
Cabellero and Hammour (1998) and Acemoglu (2003) have examined various aspects of the
share.
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be because principal-agent problems allow CEOs to build empires, but it may
also be because the organization is heavily inuenced by politicians who do
not want to see falls in employment in state (or para-statal) rms. We em-
bed this objective function in an environment of monopolistic competition and
wage bargaining. In such a model we show that labors share is likely to fall if
the manager is forced to put a greater weight on prots and a lower weight on
employment. A leading example of such a change is privatization, which will
simultaneously reduce political inuence and increase investor pressure to max-
imize prots. We also show that this model has some further novel predictions
suggesting that employment will fall and wages will rise following privatization.
Another more standard prediction of our model is that an increase in product
market competition, for example through a reduction in entry barriers, would
be associated with a rise in the wage bill share3 (as prot margins are squeezed).
Despite the interest in the causes of the fall of labors share, the empirical
work in the area is rather meagre. Most authors work with aggregate data
using cross-country panel regressions (e.g. Harrison (2002); Guscina (2006);
IMF (2007)). But a problem with this sort of evidence is that there are many
events occurring simultaneously at the macro-level and disentangling the impact
of globalization or other factors from these other events is a formidable task.
This is why it is important to use more disaggregated data. This identication
problem can be illustrated with a simple example from our dataset (a discus-
sion of the exact denitions of all variables is deferred until later). We predict
that reducing public ownership (denoted PO) and/or increasing barriers to en-
try (denoted BTE) in the product market should reduce labors share of GDP
(\SHARE"). Consider an aggregate cross-country panel OLS regression of the
labors SHARE in GDP on our indices of public ownership and entry barri-
ers. In our data, estimating this equation delivers the following encouraging
3Throughout the paper we use labor share and wage bill share interchangeably.
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regression results (standard errors in brackets):
SHARE =
0:006
(0:001)
 PO   0:029
(0:003)
BTE + time dummies
(Observations = 327, R2=0.35)
Consistent with the theory, an increase in public ownership is associated with
a signicant increase in the share of labor. Similarly, an increase in the barriers
to entry index is associated with a fall in the labor share. Both are statisti-
cally signicant at the 1% level. Unfortunately, including a full set of country
dummies drives both policy variables to statistical and economic insignicance:
SHARE =
 0:001
(0:164)
PO  0:001
(0:206)
BTE + time dummies + country dummies:
(Observations = 327, R2=0.93)
One response to these ndings would be to include observed country-wide
variables instead of the country xed e¤ects, but this is unlikely to be credible
because of the wide range of other unobserved nation-specic factors. In the
unemployment and regulation literature, researchers attempt to estimate much
more sophisticated models including country-specic time trends, longer lags,
interactions between policies and so on. But this is likely to make the identi-
cation problem worse, not better4 . Our proposal in this paper is to use some
of the inter-industry variation within countries (and over time) to identify the
e¤ects of policy changes. We nd that better data helps a lot.
A second problem with the existing literature on the macro-e¤ects of regula-
tory change is that policy changes tend to be focused in particular sectors so a
4See Nickell (2003) for example. Baker et al (2003) give a compelling criticism of the
robustness of the empirical cross country unemployment and regulation literature.
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sector specic approach is more attractive. There is a signicant line of research
in Industrial Organization focusing on the impact of deregulation in single sec-
tors5 . Although enlightening, the disadvantage of this very micro approach is
that it is hard to generalize to other sectors or across the economy as a whole.
In this paper, we take an intermediate approach using panel data from sectors
across several OECD countries. These are the network industries that have
seen the greatest degree of regulatory reform Telecoms, Post, Gas, Electricity,
Airlines, Railways and Roads. The timing and extent of these reforms vary
signicantly between countries. We exploit these di¤erences, as quantied by
the OECD in their Regulations Database on public ownership and barriers to
entry, to explicitly test some key economic mechanisms6 .
Our results suggest that disaggregation and controls for unobserved hetero-
geneity are vital in order to nd results that are consistent with theory. We nd
that falling public ownership is associated with a lower labor share and this is
driven by the positive e¤ect of public ownership on employment. This strongly
suggests that privatization is an important reason for the falling wage bill share
in the network industries in the OECD. Barriers to entry also appear to matter
in that higher barriers to entry are generally associated with a lower labor share.
This result is, however, less robust than the public ownership result.
The nding that privatization tends to reduce labors share helps to answer
the question of why labors share fell despite falling entry barriers over time (see
Torrini (2005) or Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)). The impact of privatization
does exert a strong downward pressure on labors share and this is only partially
o¤set by the increase in product market competition. Other things being equal,
we nd that although the fall in public ownership accounts for only about 20%
5For example, Rose (1987) on trucking or Olley and Pakes (1996) on telecommunications
equipment.
6The only other paper we know of that uses regulation data in a cross country industry
level panel setting is Alessini et al (2003). They nd evidence that entry barriers reduce
investment.
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of the fall in labors share on average in our sample, it can account for more
than 50% of the fall in some countries. An alternative explanation may be that
deregulation of the labor market side could reduce labors share through declines
in worker bargaining power. However, in our analysis we do not nd support
for the labor market deregulation hypothesis.
The closest paper to our own is by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) who
perform a cross-country analysis of the wage bill share across a larger number
of industries. They do not focus on direct measures of policy changes as we
do, however, and their interest is more on the role of the capital-output ratio
in accounting for changes in labors share, rather than the causes of the secular
decline in the wage bill share7 .
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 lays out some basic theory
and Section 3 details the econometric modelling approach. Section 4 describes
our data and Section 5 discusses our results. We o¤er some concluding remarks
in Section 6.
2 Theory
2.1 Basic Model
This section presents a basic model to understand how deregulation can a¤ect
labors share, wages and employment. We allow for imperfect product market
competition (monopolistic competition) and worker bargaining (à la Nash). An
important aspect of the model is that we assume that the CEO/manager who
bargains with workers does not necessarily maximize prots. We will parame-
terize this in a reduced form way by following the spirit of Baumol (1959) and
assume that the CEO maximizes a weighted function of prots and rm size
(employment). One rationale for this is that CEOs like to build empiresand
7Their data also ends in 1993 for estimation purposes whereas ours runs until the end of
the 1990s. This is important as in many countries (e.g. Italy) the most dramatic changes in
privatization occurred in the late 1990s.
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if corporate governance is weak then they will nd it easier to do this. In our
application we consider a particularly stark example of this when there is a sub-
stantial degree of public ownership. In this case, not only is governance weak,
but politicians are generally reluctant to see job losses and will generally put
some greater weight on employment than would a private sector rm. Bertrand
et al (2005), for example, present evidence that politically connected French
rms behave in exactly this manner to keep rm employment high, especially
during election years.
The rm is assumed to care about prots () and total employment (N)
so that the value function of the rm is U(; N); where
@U
@
 0; @U
@N
 0
and U(:) is a concave function. Choosing employment to maximize the value
function, given the wage (W ), leads to the following expression for the value of
the marginal product of labour (VMPL) :
VMPL =W   ( @U
@N
=
@U
@
) (1)
This implies that, for a given wage, the rm will have an employment level
higher than would be the case if the rm simply maximized prots. To simplify
we adopt the functional form:
U = 1 N (2)
where 0   < 1: Privatization, for example, can be thought of as a reduction
in : A representative organization has prots:
 = PQ WN (3)
where P is price and Q is value added and we abstract away from other
factors of production. The product market is imperfectly competitive so the
rm faces the inverse demand curve:
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P = BQ 
1
 (4)
where B is a demand index and   1 is the price elasticity of demand.
Output is produced with the production function (0 <  6 1)8 :
Q = CN (5)
Substituting (2), (3), and (4) into (1) and taking logs we obtain:
logU = (1  ) log[BC1  1N(1  1 )  WN ] +  logN (6)
The rm chooses employment to maximize the equation (6) given the wage,
leading to the labor demand equation:
logN =

1  (1  1 )
  1
1  (1  1 )
[logW logB logC1  1 log((1 1

)(1 )]
(7)
There are several things to note about the labor demand curve. First, the
stronger the preference of the employer for jobs over prots (); the higher
will be employment for a given wage. Secondly, the labor demand curve slopes
downwards with an elasticity that does not depend on the wage (i.e. "NW =
  @ logN
@ logW
=
1
1  (1  1 )
 1) and does not depend on the preferences of the
employer. The easiest way to understand why the labour demand curve slopes
downwards, even for the case where the employer only cares about employment
( = 1), is that employment will be chosen to make prots zero as the break-
even point is binding: the higher the wage, the lower the level of employment
that delivers zero prots.
8This simplied Cobb-Douglas form is for expositional purposes. Bentolila and Saint-Paul
(2003) examine more general production functions, which generate some additional implica-
tions that we will discuss in the robustness section.
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We can also derive a simple expression for the labor share from this maxi-
mization. We write the value of the marginal product of labor as:
VMPL = P (1  1

)
Q
N
(8)
Substituting these into the rst order condition (1) gives:
VMPL = P (1  1

)
Q
N
=W   ( 
1   )(
PQ
N
 W ) (9)
Re-arranging and solving for the labors share, we obtain:
SHARE  WN
PQ
= (1  1

) + (1  (1  1

)) (10)
So that the wage bill share is independent of the wage; of course this is
derived from the assumption that all functions are iso-elastic. Equation (10)
shows the key relationships we will focus on in the paper. First, in the standard
case of perfect competition and prot maximization (i.e.  = 0 and lim  !1),
equation (10) shows that the wage bill share will be equal to the technological
parameter, . However, if there is some degree of non-prot maximizing be-
havior then as  >0, the wage bill share will be higher, all else being equal.
Empirically, we will focus on public ownership as a¤ecting the departure from
prot maximizing behavior. Second, the greater the degree of monopoly power
(a lower ), the lower will be the wage bill share, all else being equal. Empiri-
cally, we will focus on higher barriers to entry, such as those caused by legal or
bureaucratic rules as a source of market power.
One further result that will be useful in what follows is the elasticity of
employer utility with respect to the wage ("UW ). By di¤erentiating (6) and
using the envelope condition, we can show that the elasticity of utility with
respect to wages is:
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"UW =   @ logU
@ logW
= (1  ) SHARE
1  SHARE =
(1  1 )(1  ) + 
1  (1  1 )
(11)
Note that this elasticity is increasing in  so that an employer who cares
a lot about employment will nd their utility reduced more by a given wage
increase than one who does not. The simplest way to understand this is to
think of the two extreme cases  = [0; 1] in which the employer only cares about
either employment or prots. An employer who is only interested in prots (i.e.
has  = 0) will have an elasticity of utility with respect to the wage which is
the elasticity of prots with respect to the wage. In contrast, an employer who
only cares about employment (i.e. has  = 1) , will have an elasticity of utility
with respect to the wage which is the elasticity of labour demand with respect
to the wage which, under the assumptions made, is greater than the elasticity
of prots with respect to the wage9 . This assumes that even state employers
face some kind of budget constraint generating a wage-employment trade-o¤10 .
The consequence of this is that an employment-maximizing employer will be
more hostile to wage rises than a prot-maximizing one.
Now consider the determination of the wage. As is standard, we consider
Nash bargaining between the workers which has the form:

 =  log V + (1  ) logU (12)
Where V is the utility of the workforce and  is the worker bargaining power
parameter. We assume that the preferences of the workers can be written as:
9This intuition suggests that this result is dependent on the wage elasticity of the labour de-
mand curve being larger than the wage elasticity of the prot function. This is not true for all
production functions, but is true for Cobb-Douglas, which seems a reasonable approximation
to the data (see for example Hamermesh (1993), chapter 3).
10Although publicly owned rms may be able to sustain losses for a greater length of time
than those in the private sector, there is still some level at which the Finance Ministry will
refuse to fund an increase in the industries level of subsidy.
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log V = log(W  A) +  logN (13)
where A is the value of the alternative outsidewage and  is the union
preferences over employment compared with the wage. Di¤erentiating 
 with
respect to wages and re-arranging delivers the wage equation:
W =
"NW + (1  )"UW
"NW + (1  )"UW   A = (1 + )A (14)
Where:
 =
[1  (1  1 )]
(1     (1  1 )) + [(1  )(1  (1  1 ))]
(15)
 can be thought of as a wage mark-up over the outside option. With these
results we can develop our predictions about the e¤ects of various changes on
the wage bill share, wages, employment, and productivity.
2.2 Analysis
The main comparative static we are interested in is what changes when privati-
zation, improved corporate governance or some other change in the environment
forces the rm to place a greater weight on prots than on rm size (i.e.  falls).
If there is a fall in the importance given to jobs in the rms value function then
our model predicts: (i) the wage bill share of value added will fall, (ii) the av-
erage wage will rise, (iii) employment will fall. The fall in the wage bill share
follows directly from equation (10) since 1   (1  1 ) > 0: This is quite intuitive
and general, since a greater focus on prots in the objective function, relative to
jobs, will lead to an increase in prots as a share of output. Wages will rise from
equation (15) because (1 )(1 (1  1 ) > 0 and employment falls from equa-
tion (7). The intuition is that an employer who cares a lot about employment
will be much more sensitive to an increase in the wage than one who places a
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much greater importance on prot maximization because employment is more
sensitive to wages than prots.
It may seem surprising that our model predicts lower wages in the public
sector as most people assume that public sector workers earn wage rents. But
this may be a misapprehension if the main benet of being in the public sector
is job protection through very high employment levels compared to the private
sector. Controlling for selection, both Disney and Gosling (2003) and Postal-
Viney and Turon (2005) nd that in Britain there is close to zero public sector
wage rents on average11 .
Next, consider a change in the degree of product market competition. In our
model, an increase in product market competition leads to a higher sensitivity of
quantity to price (i.e. an increase in ). This will raise the wage bill share (from
equation (10)), and reduce wages (from equation (15)) as it makes the labor
demand curve more elastic. Finally, it will increase employment from equation
(7). Finally, consider a decrease in worker bargaining power ( falls). This will
reduce wages, raise employment but leave the labor share unchanged12 .
These predictions are summarized in Table 1. We will take these predictions
to the data, focusing on the primary predictions of public ownership, but also
examining product market competition. We will nd support for most of the
model predictions in the data. Despite the interest in worker power, we have
the least to say here empirically; perhaps because we lack good empirical indi-
cators of bargaining power. The data does not give strong support to the union
bargaining story.
11 It is more likely that some groups of individuals in the public sector earn a positive
premium and others obtain a negative premium compared to the private sector due to greater
wage compression. For example, high skilled men in high cost areas may do worse than low
skilled women in low cost areas.
12This result obviously depends on the assumptions of an iso-elastic demand curve and a
Cobb-Douglas technology.
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2.3 Some Extensions to the model
This analysis is solely in partial equilibrium and there are other e¤ects present
in the general equilibrium settings, as described by Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003). They show how one can derive a positive e¤ect of bargaining power on
labors share in a general equilibrium, e¢ cient bargaining framework.
Another possible extension is to allow for heterogeneous labor. Assume that
there are two types of labor, skilled (denoted by a subscript S) and unskilled
labor (denoted by a subscript U). They have di¤erent market wages but we
still assume that it is total employment that the manager cares about. In this
case, the relative value marginal product can still be written:
VMPLS
VWPLU
=
WS   ( @U
@N
=
@U
@
)
WU   ( @U
@N
=
@U
@
)
(16)
In the public sector there will be an over employment of unskilled workers
relative to skilled workers (as it is cheaper to indulge the preference for larger
employment size by employing more low-wage workers). If we consider the case
of total privatization (a change to =0) this will lead to a reduction in the
employment of unskilled workers. Consequently privatization will lead not only
to a fall in employment but also to an increase in the observed average wage as
there is a compositional shift to the more skilled.
Finally, there may be e¤ort bargaining. Andrews and Simmons (1995) argue
that the big decline in jobs (but not wages) of large UK unionized workplaces
in the 1980s can be explained by a model where unions bargain over both wages
and e¤ort but their inuence over e¤ort has declined. We would obtain similar
results if we assumed that after privatization the nature of bargaining changed
from an e¢ cient bargain over both wages and employment to a right-to-
manage model in which only wages are negotiated. In fact, Bentolila and
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Saint-Paul (2003) formally show that increases in worker bargaining power will
usually increase labors share in an e¢ cient bargaining model.
3 Econometric Models
Our basic equation of interest is:
SHAREijt = 
S
i POijt + 
S
i BTEijt + 
S
ij + (t  vSi ) + uSijt (17)
where SHARE is the share of the wage bill in value added for industry i in
country j at time t. PO is an index of the degree of public ownership and BTE
is an index of barriers to entry. There are two key predictions from the theory.
First, labors share should be increasing in the importance of public ownership
(Si > 0). Second, that high entry barriers will reduce labors share of value
added (Si < 0).
We consider a number of additional controls to deal with unobserved hetero-
geneity. First, we include a full set of industry-country xed e¤ects (Sij) which
turn out to be very important control variables. Second, we include industry-
specic time trends (tvSi ) these are generally signicant. The nal error term
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors (uSijt) although we allow it
to be heteroskedactic and serially correlated (using the Newey-West technique).
In our basic regressions we pool over industries, setting Si = 
S and Si = 
S ;
but in our extended regressions we look separately by industry and allow BTE
and PO to have industry-specic coe¢ cients.
Our models also have predictions over the behavior of employment and
wages, so we estimate analogous employment equations of the form:
lnNijt = 
N
i POijt + 
N
i BTEijt + 
N
ij + (t  vNi ) + uNijt (18)
The basic model predicts that Ni >0 and 
N
i <0.
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Finally, we consider using average wages, W , as the dependent variable:
lnWijt = 
W
i POijt + 
W
i BTEijt + 
W
ij + (t  vWi ) + uWijt (19)
Our model predicts Wi < 0 as the public rm nds it easier to indulge its
preference for jobs by over-employing unskilled workers, leading to a low average
wage. We would expect Wi > 0 because workers in protected industries can
capture some of the monopoly rents in the form of higher wages. We also
consider adding various proxies for worker bargaining power to equations (17)
to (19). As we show below these were insignicant and often perversely signed.
A concern with the estimation of equations (17), (18) and (19) is that the
policy variables PO and BTE may not be exogenous. We regard this as unlikely
as the policy variables are nationally decided (or sometimes internationally, as in
the case of the EU Single Market Program) rather than inuenced by industry
specic shocks. Nevertheless, to check this concern we report experiments using
country-wide socio-political variables as instrumental variables for PO13 . To
tackle this problem we consider using socio-political variables as instruments.
A change in the governing party from a left wing party to a right wing party
in the previous year is likely to be associated with greater privatization but
unlikely to be associated with any industry-specic wage bill shock. We also
use lagged country-wide changes in attitudes towards state ownership from the
World Value Survey as another factor that increases the probability of privati-
zation but is unlikely to be inuenced by a shock to the wage bill share of the
network industries. The instruments are not perfect, of course, as there may
be other unobserved factors correlated with these socio-political variables that
cause a change in the wage bill share. For example, a new government may also
13For example, consider an exogenous industry-specic shock that increases the labor share
in a public sector industry. This may translate into giving labor unions greater resources
through strike funds (relative to state managers) that could be used to resist attempted
privatization. Consequently, we may see high labor share associated with greater public
ownership due to reverse causation (a higher labor share causes a higher value of PO).
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introduce other reforms that a¤ect the wage bill share, such as labor legislation.
We try and condition directly on such variables, but we can never be sure that
some are not controlled for.
4 Data
4.1 Data Sources
We obtained our data on public ownership (PO) and barriers to entry (BTE)
from the OECDs regulation database (see Data Appendix A and Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2000a,b, 2003)). These were kindly supplied at a greater degree of
disaggregation than is publicly available in the standard OECD publications by
Giuseppe Nicoletti. Public Ownership (PO) is scaled between 0 (no public sec-
tor involvement) to 6 (complete public ownership and control). This captures a
combination of government ownership, control and interference in the running
of the industry. These measures are developed from an in-depth analysis of
the country-specic regulation working with the relevant departments in each
OECD country. For example, even when an industry has been privatized, gov-
ernments will typically own some proportion of equity in the dominant rm, and
other things equal the PO measure will be higher the larger is this percentage.
Barriers to Entry is also an index on the scale of 0 (lowest barriers to entry) to 6
(highest barriers to entry). As with public ownership, the OECD calculated this
index based on a detailed examination of costs of entering the industry based
on the administrative, legal and political obstacles.
The second dataset we draw on is the OECDs STAN database. This
includes information on wage bills (including all employer costs) and value
added, which we use to calculate SHARE (the wage bill divided by indus-
try value added/GDP). It also includes information on employment that we
use to calculate average wages (the wage bill divided by employment)14 . Since
14 In a few cases this can exceed unity (if the industry is making losses). We windsorized
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there are some missing values on employment in STAN we drew on a third
database, the Gronnigen Industry Productivity Database (downloaded from
http://www.euklems.net/) to supplement STAN. STAN also has information
on gross output, investment and wage bills.
In combining the datasets we had to aggregate across some industries to
obtain consistent series. Although we also examine some other industry disag-
gregations in the descriptive statistics, the main econometric analysis is conned
to three sectors in the network industries across eighteen countries between 1970
and 2001 (it is an unbalanced panel see Table A1). The network industries in-
clude Electricity and Gas, Telecommunications (including Post) and Transport
(Airlines and Railways and Roads). The Data Appendix gives more informa-
tion and descriptive statistics on the construction of the database. Table 2
gives some basic descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the dataset.
All values are expressed in real US 1996 dollars evaluated at Purchasing Power
Parities (PPPs) from the OECD.
We also use two datasets to obtain the socio-political variables that are used
as instrumental variables: the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Database of
Political Institutions (DPI). For the purpose of our study, the variables of most
interest are: (1) Self positioning in the political scale (which ranges from 1 (left)
to 10 (right)), and (2) the DPI provide details about the party compositions of
the Opposition and Government coalition. We look at whether the party in
power is right wing or not (See Data Appendix for more details).
A drawback of the dataset is that we do not have detailed information on
the human capital characteristics of the workers. We attempt to capture these
in the empirical work by including xed e¤ects specic to an industry-country
pairing, time dummies, industry specic time trends.
the variable to take a maximum value of unity in these cases, but the results are robust to
using the raw data.
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4.2 General Trends in the Data
In order to understand the declining labor share we need to highlight where
the changes are taking place. We focus on the business sector(i.e. excluding
health, education and public administration). This is where most of the change
took place in the 1980s and 1990s and is not solely in the governments control.
Table 3 reports the results for the change in labors share between 1980 and
2000 for each country. We only report the results for the countries for which
we have continuous data from both 1980 and 200015 . Column (1) of Table 3
shows the stylized fact that has been noted elsewhere: the share of value added
going to workers has fallen in every country we consider, on average by over ve
percentage points (or 8 percent of the 1980 average share of 65%). This ranges
from an 8.83% point fall in the US to a 1.85% point fall in (West) Germany.
Figure 1 graphically shows the changes in the country-wide share of the wage bill
and it is clear that it is falling over time in every country. Given the historical
stability of the wage bill share, this represents a substantial change.
We can always decompose the total change in share for each of the (groups
of) industries into the within industryand between industrychanges. To be
precise, for any country j we denote the wage bill share as SHAREi for indus-
try i. For this exercise we divided the business sector into four broad industries
Network Industries, Manufacturing, Financial and Wholesale/Retail/Hotels.
In the main empirical work we focus on sub-sectors within the network indus-
tries (where there has been the most signicant time series variation in public
ownership and entry barriers). The total change in the aggregate labor share
(SHARE) can be decomposed into two components, one due to realloca-
tion of production between industries with di¤erent levels of the labor share
15Although we use STAN for most of the analysis, here we use the data from the Gronnigen
Industry Productivity Database since it has a continuous dataset from 1980. The datasets
are explained in more detail in the Appendix.
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(
P
i SHAREiV Ai) and the other due to changes in the level of share within
industries (
P
i V AiSHAREi):
SHARE =
X
i
SHAREiV Ai +
X
i
V AiSHAREi (20)
where V Ai denotes the value added of industry i as a fraction of the total
value added in the business sector and SHAREi and V Ai represent a simple
average of the wage bill share and value added for industry i over time, respec-
tively.
In the Appendix, Table A2 gives the complete between and within changes
for each industry included in the business sector. In columns (4) and (5) of Table
3 we report the results for the two most important contributions: the between
changes in manufacturing and the within changes in the network industries (the
nal column reports the sum of all the other components). It can be seen that
the fall in manufacturing share of value added can account for a great deal of the
fall in the wage bill share. Figure 2 shows this more clearly. This is interesting
in itself as it suggests that the decline of manufacturing is an important factor in
the falling wage bill share. For example, part of the greater fall in the American
labor share compared to the German labor share is due to the faster rate of
de-industrialization in the US relative to Germany.
Nevertheless, both Table 3 and Figure 2 show that a substantial component
of the aggregate fall in the labor share is attributable to changes occurring within
the network industries. On average, changes in the network industries account
for a quarter of the aggregate change in the wage bill share (even though they
contribute, on average, only seventeen percent of aggregate value added).
The impact of the network industries is further highlighted in Figures 3, 4
and 5. Figure 3 plots the time series variation of the wage bill share in the net-
work industries. Compared with Figure 1 where we examined the economy as a
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whole, the fall of the wage bill share in the network industries has been larger,
on average (both gures are on the same scale). Figure 4 plots the change in the
(mean) public ownership index and Figure 5 plots the mean barriers to entry
variables in these industries. The OECD Regulation Database reports variation
across countries at the macro-level, but only reports regulatory variation over
time for the network industries. Overall there has been a trend towards privati-
zation and a reduction in entry barriers across all countries. Figures 3 through
5 show that there is substantial heterogeneity between countries and industries
in the change in the wage bill share and the pace of reform. It is for this reason
we focus on these sectors in the paper.
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
Table 4 contains our main results from pooling the sectors across industries and
countries. We divide the results into three panels. Our main results are for the
wage bill share (Panel A) and we consider employment in Panel B and wages in
Panel C.
The rst two columns of each panel include only public ownership (and the
controls), the third and fourth columns include only barriers to entry together
and the nal two columns include both public ownership and barriers to entry.
For each dependent variable we rst present the results without xed e¤ects
then the results with a full set of xed e¤ects (industry dummies interacted
with country dummies) in the next column. All specications include a full set
of time, country and industry dummies and separate time trends for each sector.
Turning rst to the wage bill share regressions in Panel A, we nd that
the two key predictions of the basic model appear to be strongly supported by
the data. Public Ownership (PO) has a positive e¤ect on the share of value
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added accruing to labor. This relationship is strong with and without the xed
e¤ects (e.g., the coe¢ cient is 1.002 in column (1) and 0.764 in column (2)).
The magnitude suggests that the results (with xed e¤ects) are economically,
as well as statistically, signicant. Moving from the highest to the lowest degree
of public ownership (i.e. from 6 to 0) is predicted to reduce the wage bill share
by seven percentage points (note that the entire average time series change in
labors share between 1980 and 2000 was 5.3%). The barrier to entry (BTE)
variable appears to have a negative impact on the wage bill share as theory
predicts, however it is only signicant at the 10% level in column (4). In the
nal two columns we control for both of the policy variables simultaneously.
This increases the absolute magnitude of the coe¢ cients on the policy variables
because falls in public ownership and entry barriers tend to covary positively
(both are pursued at the same time by liberalizing governments). In our most
general regression, the preferred specication of the nal column, the coe¢ cient
on public ownership is 0.898 compared to 0.764 in column (2). Similarly, the
coe¢ cient on entry barriers is 0.495 compared to 0.397 in column (4). Both
policy variables are signicant at the ve percent level.
Panel B of Table 4 shows the employment regressions. The coe¢ cient on
PO in the rst column is very negative (which is contrary to our theoretical
predictions). When we include xed e¤ect in column (2), however, the e¤ect of
public ownership becomes positive and highly signicant as we would predict
from our model. Privatization is predicted to reduce employment, as is consis-
tent with other evidence (e.g. Green and Haskel (2004)). In columns (3) and
(4) we observe that BTE is positive but insignicantly associated with a fall
in employment, which is not what our model predicts (it should be negative).
Turning to the preferred specication of the nal column we see, as in Panel A,
that the marginal e¤ects of the policy variables are correctly signed and highly
signicant for public ownership (which is associated with higher employment)
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but the barriers to entry variable remains insignicant. A one point decrease in
PO is predicted to reduce employment by 3%.
The nal panel of Table 4 (Panel C) looks at average wages. Wages appear
to be signicantly lower in industries that are subject to more public ownership,
whether or not we control for xed e¤ects (compare columns (1) and (2)). In
columns (3) and (4) we nd that increases in entry barriers are associated with
higher wages (as our model predicts), however the e¤ect is not signicant. In
the nal column we still nd that public ownership is associated with lower
wages and entry barriers with higher wage but only the public ownership e¤ect
is signicant at conventional levels. A one point fall in PO is associated with a
two percent fall in average wages.
In summary, we nd that privatization is associated with a signicantly lower
labor share, a signicantly higher average wage and a signicantly lower number
of jobs, other things being equal. These are all in line with the theoretical
predictions of our simple model summarized in Table 1. Furthermore, we nd
that lower barriers are associated with a signicantly higher wage bill share
which is also consistent with the model. The results on average wages and
employment are less conclusive - the entry barriers variable is not signicant in
the wage or employment equation (although it is correctly signed in the wage
equation).
5.2 Industry heterogeneity
Table 5 breaks down the results by the three network industries. As before, the
main labor share results are in Panel A. The employment equations are in Panel
B and the average wage results in Panel C. We only show our preferred speci-
cation where all estimates include a full set of xed e¤ects and time dummies.
It is clear that the strongest results are again for public ownership. In eight of
the nine regressions the coe¢ cients are of the correct sign. Turning to the BTE
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variable, we see that in the SHARE regressions the BTE is correctly signed
(negative) in two of the three regressions. As was suggested in the pooled results
in Table 4, there is not a clear picture on wages and employment. For example,
BTE takes its expected negative sign in the employment equation for transport
but has an unexpected positive sign for Electricity/Gas and Telecoms.
In summary, the results in Table 5, when we disaggregate by industry, show
a very clear pattern for the public ownership variable, which is similar to that in
the pooled results of Table 4. Public ownership is associated with a higher labor
share and this is driven by the positive e¤ect of public ownership on employment
(since the wage e¤ect is negative). This strongly suggests that privatization is
an important reason for the falling wage bill share in the network industries.
Furthermore, barriers to entry also appear to matter higher entry barriers are
generally associated with lower labor shares of value added.
5.3 Quantication
Table 6 examines how well our simple model performs in accounting for some of
the trends in the labor share between 1980 and 1998 in the network industries
as a whole. The rst column shows the empirical fall in the labor share between
these years, which were, on average, over ten percentage points - much larger
than the change for the whole business sector as shown in Table 3 (5.3 percentage
points). Although every country experienced some fall in labors share of value
added in the network industries, it was obviously much more rapid in some
countries than in others16 .
These declines in the labor share have coincided with a fall in barriers to
entry and public ownership in every country. We make a back of the envelope
calculation of how much privatization can account for the change in the wage
16The large fall in Italy is mainly post 1995 (the 1980-1994 fall was 16 percentage points),
which coincided with a major utility privatization in 1995.
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bill of the network industries. Using our preferred estimates of the e¤ect of
privatization (-0.009) and the empirical fall in public ownership (on average the
index fell by 1.583 points) we account for, on average, twenty percent of the
fall. This is a signicant, although not an overwhelming fraction of the change.
Note though that there is much heterogeneity by country. Whereas we can only
account for under two percent of the change in the wage bill share of the US
(which had very little privatization) we can account for over fty percent of the
change in France and Britain.
In the absence of any changes in public ownership, we predict that labors
share should have risen in every country due to the decrease in barriers to
entry, which enables stronger competition to erode rm margins. Column (5)
of Table 6 shows that entry barriers fell on average by 2.2 points. Therefore,
our story is essentially that falls in entry barriers were outweighed by the role
of privatization in accounting for some of the fall in labors share.
5.4 Labor Market Regulation
Although our basic model predicts no e¤ect of worker power on wage bill shares
this may occur in various extensions to other bargaining models. Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003) have pointed to labor market deregulation as a possible
cause of the declining wage bill share, especially in European countries. We
investigated in some detail whether labor market deregulation could also play a
role in understanding the falling share of labor in value added. We augmented
our specications to include various OECD measures of the regulation of labor
markets such as hiring and ring costs, the labor conict rate, replacement
rates, bite of the minimum wage, the coverage and coordination of collective
bargaining, etc. These were all statistically insignicantly di¤erent from zero
(see Appendix Table A3 for examples).
A disadvantage of these labor market measures compared to the public own-
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ership and barriers to entry measures is that they do not have variation at the
industry level over time (only at the country level over time). Consequently, it
may be hard to identify their e¤ect separately from the industry time trends,
time dummies, and country dummies. A possible exception is union density that
does have within industry variation. Consequently we include union density in
Table 7 as an additional regressor in the preferred models of Table 4, with and
without xed e¤ects. Columns (1) and (2) have the wage bill share regressions,
columns (3) and (4) the employment equations and columns (5) and (6) the
wage equations. Although we lose a few observations because of missing val-
ues on the union density variable, it is reassuring that our main results remain
robust on this sub-sample. In particular, public ownership is associated with
a higher wage bill share, higher employment level and lower wage level. The
union density variable is negative and insignicant in the wage bill regressions
in the rst two columns. This is consistent with our predictions, but not with
a model that emphasizes labor market regulation as the key reason for the fall
in wage bill shares.
In the xed e¤ects models of column (4) of Table 4 we do nd a negative
(although insignicant) association of union power with employment, which is
consistent with the expectation of Table 1. The marginal e¤ects of the other
variables also grow stronger compared to Table 417 . Unfortunately, the union
density variable enters with a signicantly negative coe¢ cient in the wage equa-
tion of the nal column. This is inconsistent with our model and almost any
other bargaining model, making us suspicious of the interpretation of the union
density variable. It is possible that we are picking up the higher union mem-
bership of less skilled workers (who get paid lower wages) with the union power
variable in these regressions, so union density merely reects (unobserved) com-
17Also the entry barrier variable in the employment equation is now correctly signed (al-
though still insignicant), which it was not in the earlier table.
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positional changes).
We conclude that there is no empirical support for the view that declining
labor market institutions are the cause of the falling wage bill share. This,
however, may be a reection of the di¢ culty in nding an adequate measure of
worker bargaining power in the type of data that we have available.
5.5 Instrumental Variable Results
In the econometric section we discussed reasons why there may be endogene-
ity bias for the privatization indicator. We investigate this issue in Table 8
where we use two socio-political variables as instrumental variables. The rst
is the median persons stated political position on a ten point left-wing/right-
wing scale, as revealed in the World Value Survey. The second is the political
complexion of the governing party (in the previous year). Note that these are
country and time period specic. First, column (1) shows the baseline OLS
results in the preferred specication of column (6), Panel A in Table 4. The
sample is slightly smaller because we have a few missing observations on the
socio-political variables, but the results are very similar to those reported for
the full sample.
Column (2) of Table 8 presents the rst stage where we regress public own-
ership on our two instruments (and the other exogenous covariates including
xed e¤ects). Both variables are individually signicant and correctly signed.
When a more right wing party is in power, privatization becomes signicantly
more likely. Similarly when the median voter moves to the left in his political
attitudes, public ownership becomes more likely (a one point movement to the
left is associated with about a twenty-seven percentage point increase in the
public ownership index).
The third column presents the IV results. The public ownership variable
remains statistically signicant at the 10% level with a coe¢ cient that is larger
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than that of column (1). This is reassuring as it suggests that the results
reported earlier are robust and not due to a spurious endogeneity bias.
5.6 Further Robustness Tests - Amore general production
function
We also conducted a variety of other robustness tests on the results, a few of
which we report here.
In Table 9 we follow Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) to include determinants
of labour share, such as the capital-output ratio, that allow for a departure from
the Cobb-Douglas framework (i.e. the elasticity of substitution can be di¤erent
from unity). Like them we also allow control for capital augmenting technical
progress (TFP) and labour adjustment costs (i.e. a labour conict rate). We
have some reservations about including these as controls as some are clearly
endogenous (e.g. TFP). Nevertheless we want to ensure that our main results
are not biased by excluding potentially important omitted variables from the
regressions18 . Columns (1) and (2) present our original labor share specication
with and without controlling for the capital-output ratio, respectively. Obser-
vations were the capital-output ratio is missing are dropped so the sample size
is slightly smaller. We can see that our estimates of PO and BTE are largely
unchanged with the inclusion of the capital-output ratio (from 0.987 to 1.029 for
public ownership and from -0.822 to -0.874 for barriers to entry). The capital-
output ratio is negative and signicant, suggesting that capital and labour in
these industries are on average substitutes. In columns (3) to (6) we repeat
the exercise using TFP and the labour conict rate, respectively. Again, it is
reassuring that our estimates of PO and BTE do not change much from our
original specication and if anything, become stronger. According to Bentolila
18Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) use lags of the endogenous variables as instrumental
variables, but this identication strategy hinges on assumptions over the absence of higher
order serial correlation.
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and Saint-Paul (2003), if TFP is strictly capital augmenting, it should have the
same sign as the capital output ratio. This is not the case, suggesting that
there is a more complex e¤ect of productivity on the production function. The
labour conict rate, like our union density measure, is insignicant. Finally, in
column (8), we include all three of these measures. Our estimates of PO and
BTE remain robust but the capital-output ratio becomes insignicant.
Next, we experimented with di¤erent dynamic structures on the policy vari-
ables by including extra lags of public ownership and barriers to entry (see
Appendix Table A4). There do not seem to be additional dynamics of adjust-
ment as the additional lags were statistically insignicant. In Table A5 we show
the robustness of the results to conditioning the estimates of Table 4 to a sample
where we have non-missing data on all dependent variables.
In addition, we experimented with a full set of country trend interactions.
In the labor share regressions the point estimates do not change very much, the
marginal e¤ect on the labor share falls from 0.898 to 0.602 and the e¤ect of
BTE is almost unchanged (from -0.495 to- 0.487). However, the PO estimate
is no longer signicant when we include these interactions. The problem being
that when we allow for such a demanding specication we lose a great deal of
identication. We try to resolve this problem by introducing manufacturing as
a quasi-control group; the additional industry acts as a counterfactual group,
where we assume that there has been no public ownership or change in barriers
to entry. The point estimates are again signicant at the 5% level similar to
our original specication in the rst column (from 0.898 to 0.750 for public
ownership and from -0.495 to -0.452 for barriers to entry). In turn, our results
remain robust with the inclusion of the country trend interactions (see Table
A6 for full results).
Finally, we also examined a productivity equation to investigate whether
the results on the share could be driven by increased productivity when indus-
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tries moved into the private sector. Although public ownership did seem to be
associated with lower productivity, the results were not su¢ ciently robust in
magnitude nor statistical signicance.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we show that there is robust empirical evidence that privatization
has been a cause of the fall of labors share of value added over the past two
decades. We set up a simple model that showed how privatization might do
just this because of the preference for employment over prots displayed in
the objectives of publicly owned rms. By contrast, falling barriers to entry
should increase labors share of income as competition erodes prot margins.
Our model also predicts that employment should fall and wages should rise
following privatization, which also appears to be consistent with the data.
We exploit a number of policy experiments across several networkindus-
tries in many OECD countries in order to identify these e¤ects. These relation-
ships are very di¢ cult to estimate from solely macro-economic data as product
market deregulation is very industry specic and the aggregate data may be
swamped by many events that are taking place simultaneously in the aggregate
economy.
We nd after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, consistently with the-
ory, that falling entry barriers increase labors share of value added. On the
other hand, declining state control tends to reduce labors share. These results
are robust to a number of controls, including adding a full set of xed e¤ects
and using socio-political variable as instruments.
Quantitatively, we nd that the wave of privatization in OECD countries
is signicant part of the declining share of labor in the network industries 
accounting for a fth of the fall on average, but over half in Britain and France.
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However, the within sector change of the network industries only accounts for a
quarter of the overall fall in the wage bill share. Consequently, privatization does
not seem to be the dominant factor in explaining what is going on at the macro
level. A caveat to this is that there are many other forms of privatization, such as
public sector outsourcing, manufacturing privatization, quasi-market reforms in
health and education, etc., that we are not considering due to data constraints.
If not privatization, then what are the other factors that could account for the
fall in labors share? Labor market liberalization is an obvious culprit, but we
did not nd compelling evidence that this was a major factor. Globalization
may be a possibility but this may be di¢ cult to tackle with micro-economic
data. Indeed a large component of the change (see Table 3) may simply be the
shift of the economy out of manufacturing which may be related to trade, but
may also be driven by technology and tastes.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 OECD Regulation Databases
The key dataset is the OECD Regulation database developed by Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2000, 2003a,b). There are overall country-wide indicators of regu-
lation, barriers to entry (BTE) and public ownership (PO) for 21 countries
between 1975 and 1998. There are also industry-specic time series for barriers
to entry and public ownership for seven non-manufacturing industries, which
is our focus in this paper. These were kindly supplied at a greater degree of
disaggregation than is publicly available in the standard OECD publications by
Giuseppe Nicoletti. All of these are on a scale of 0 to 6 (from least to most
restrictive).
Public Ownership measures the share of equity owned by municipal or central
governments in rms of a given sector. The two polar cases are of no public
ownership (PO = 0) and full public ownership (PO = 6). Intermediate values
of the public ownership indicator are calculated as an increasing function of
the actual share of equity held by the government in the dominant rm. The
information in the OECDs data also draws upon the OECDs Privatization
Database and the Fraser Institutes Economic Freedom of the World Reports.
Barriers to Entry cover legal limitations on the number of companies in
potentially competitive markets and rules on vertical integration of network
industries. The barriers to entry indicator takes a value of zero when entry is
free(dened as a situation with three or more competitors and with complete
ownership separation of a natural monopoly and a competitive section of the
industry) and a value of six when entry is severely restricted (i.e. situations with
legal monopoly and full vertical integration in network industries or restrictive
licensing in other industries). Intermediate values represent partial liberalization
of entry (e.g. legal duopoly, mere accounting separation of natural monopoly
and competitive segments).
The construction of the indicators takes the following steps. First, the sep-
arate indicators are constructed at the nest level of industry disaggregation.
Second, these indicators are then aggregated at the industry level using revenue
averaged weights. Thirdly, for the country-wide aggregators the industry indices
are aggregated using revenue weights again.
For more information on the construction, properties and descriptive statis-
tics of this data see Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000) or Alessini et al (2003).
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A.2 Labor Market Regulations
Our labour market regulation measures are drawn from the OECD, Bell and
Dryden (1996), Nickell et al (2002), Nickell (2003) and Baker et al (2004). For
the union density information we drew on the work of Visser (2003).
A.3 Industry Data: STAN, ISDB and Gronnigen Data-
bases
The main data source for investment, value added, wage bill and employment
comes from the OECD STAN database for Industrial Analysis, based on the In-
ternational Standard Industrial Classication Revision 3 (SIC Rev. 3). We had
to aggregate the regulation data to the most disaggregated STAN level avail-
able. These were the following ve industries: Electricity and Gas; Telecom-
munications and Post; Transport (Airlines, Railways and Road Freight). We
supplemented STAN with information on the capital stock from the OECDs
International Sectoral DataBase (ISDB). We used ISDB to allocate the capital
stock to STAN in the rst year and then used the perpetual inventory method
to build up the capital stock using gross investment ows from STAN. We used
a depreciation rate of eight percent.
We also drew on the Gronnigen Database to supplement employment series
that were sometimes missing in STAN and ISDB for particular industries in
particular years. Although for most part the STAN and Groningen data on
employment is compatible, there are three discrepancies for UK in the late
1990s, which we drop from our analysis. Because of non-overlapping data from
STAN and Gronnigen we have slightly di¤erent numbers of observations for the
three main regressions (SHARE, wages and employment). Table A1 gives the
nal balance of the panel on the non-missing observations.
A.4 Database of Political Institutions: World Bank Data-
base
The Database of Political Institutions (DPI) contains 106 variables for 177 coun-
tries over the years 1975-2004. The variables provide details about elections,
electoral rules, types of political system, party compositions of the opposition
and government coalition and the extent of military inuence on the govern-
ment.
We look at the cross-country time series of whether the party of government
is right-wing or not. To identify the party orientation with respect to economic
policy, they use the criteria: (1) Right : for parties that are dened as conserva-
tive, Christian Democratic or right-wing, (2) Left : for parties that are dened as
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communist, socialist, social democratic or left wing, (3) Centre: for parties that
are self-dened as centrist or when the party position can best be described as
centrist , (4) All those cases which do not t into the other mentioned categories
or when there is no information.
A.5 Socio-political Attitudes: World Value Survey
The World Values Survey (WVS) is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural
and political change. Interviews are carried out with nationally representative
samples of the public. The World Values Survey provides a broad range of
variables for analyzing the impact of the values and beliefs of the public. We
used the variable that measures self positioning in the political scale - this
ranges from 1 (far left) to 10 (far right).
The interviews were conducted with a representative sample of at least 1,000
adults aged over 18 from each country. To ensure that the variables that we use
are nationally representative we apply the provided sampling weights. When
merging this data with other data we collapse the variables at the median. We
also repeated the analysis by collapsing at the mean with similar results. The
survey was carried out in 1981, 1990, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000 and 2001,
but for most countries we only have data in years 1981, 1990 and 1999. We
interpolated linearly over missing years. We do not have data for Greece until
1999 so it is dropped from the data.
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Table 1: Theoretical predictions 
 
 Notation Empirical 
proxy 
labor share 
of value 
added 
Average 
wages 
Employment 
Experiment   SHARE W N 
      
Increase in 
weight given 
to profits in 
firm value 
equation 
 
φ  Public 
Ownership 
(PO 
down) 
FALLS RISES FALLS 
Increase in 
Product 
market 
competition 
 
η Barriers to 
Entry 
(BTE 
down) 
RISES FALLS RISES 
Decrease in 
worker 
bargaining 
power 
β Union 
Density 
(UNION 
down) 
ZERO FALLS ZERO 
  
NOTES:- See Section 2 for derivation of these comparative static results 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
      
Barriers to Entry (PO) 944 4.240 1.886 0 6 
Aggregate Public Ownership (PO) 944 4.200 1.754 0 6 
Labor Share of Value added 944 0.491 0.161 0.195 0.957 
Employment 1070 331,957 540,630 11,000 2,834,000
Value Added($m) 944 25,325 42,775 63 299851 
Wage Bill ($m) 944 12,737 21,091 23 176899 
Average Wages($) 873 37,252 9,736 11,361 91,747 
Union Density 792 0.438 0.210 0.086 0.911 
 
NOTES:-  Means and standard deviations from sample (see Data Appendix for a full description).  
Employment data comes from Gronnigen Industry Productivity Database. The number of observations 
for wages is lower because we calculate real wages using the wage bill divided by employment and 
there are missing values in each. All values are expressed in real US 1996 dollars evaluated at PPPs 
from the OECD. Union density is from Visser (2003). 
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Table 3: Changes in the labor share, 1980-2000 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Country 
Change in 
Business 
Sector 
Labor share 
1980 
Labor 
Share 2000 
Within 
Network 
Industries 
Change 
Between 
Manufacturing 
Change 
All Other 
Components 
       
Austria -4.02 60.87 56.86 -0.269 -1.890 -1.856 
    6.70% 47.07% 46.23% 
France -5.60 65.71 60.11 0.323 -5.645 -0.277 
    -5.77% 100.81% 4.96% 
Germany -1.85 69.17 67.32 -1.908 -4.330 4.389 
    103.19% 234.20% -237.39% 
Italy -6.22 65.75 59.53 -4.077 -5.904 3.758 
    65.52% 94.87% -60.39% 
Netherlands -7.02 62.54 55.52 -1.016 -3.528 -2.476 
    14.47% 50.26% 35.27% 
Spain -4.37 54.07 49.70 -1.164 -8.418 5.210 
    26.63% 192.55% -119.18% 
USA -8.83 70.17 61.34 -1.234 -6.544 -1.052 
    13.98% 74.11% 11.91% 
United 
Kingdom -4.34 69.45 65.12 -1.572 -8.308 5.544 
    36.25% 191.60% -127.85% 
       
Average -5.28 64.72 59.44 -1.365 -5.571 1.655 
    25.84% 105.50% -31.34% 
 
NOTES:- Data from Gronnigen Industry Productivity Database; coefficients are multiplied by 100 (so 
the element in the first row and column indicates that the labor share of value added fell by four 
percentage points in Austria between 1980 and 2000 from 61% to 57%). The decomposition formula 
used is equation (20) in the text. We present only three elements: the within component from Network 
Industries, the Between Component from the manufacturing sector and the residual of all other effects 
(see Table A1 for a complete breakdown). 
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Table 4: Econometric Results (Pooling over network industries) 
Panel A - Labor Share 
        
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Dependent variable Labor Share 
        
Public Ownership (PO) 1.022 0.764    1.120 0.898 
  (0.380) (0.331)    (0.387) (0.339) 
Barriers to Entry (BTE)    -0.246 -0.397 -0.424 -0.495 
     (0.288) (0.246) (0.287) (0.246) 
           
Trend*Telecom -0.832 -0.771 -0.819 -0.735 -0.840 -0.773 
  (0.158) (0.109) (0.157) (0.108) (0.158) (0.108) 
Trend*Electricity -0.086 -0.086 -0.046 -0.017 -0.055 -0.037 
  (0.137) (0.083) (0.140) (0.090) (0.138) (0.089) 
           
Fixed Effects (54) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country Dummies (18) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies  (24) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 944 944 944 944 944 944 
 
Panel B - Employment  
        
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Dependent variable Ln(Employment) 
        
Public Ownership (PO) -13.109 3.266    -13.314 3.085 
  (2.342) (0.996)    (2.600) (1.046) 
Barriers to Entry (BTE)     -2.695 1.054 0.560 0.603 
      (1.337) (0.567) (1.475) (0.595) 
           
Trend*Telecom 0.437 -0.258 0.292 -0.182 0.431 -0.259 
  (0.922) (0.155) (0.932) (0.158) (0.920) (0.155) 
Trend*Electricity 0.481 -0.654 0.149 -0.614 0.432 -0.706 
  (0.947) (0.198) (0.932) (0.216) (0.933) (0.211) 
            
Fixed Effects (57) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country Dummies (19) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (20) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1070 1070 1070 1070 1070 1070 
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Table 4: Econometric Results (Pooling Over network Industries)- Cont.  
  
Panel C – Wages  
        
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Dependent variable Ln(Wage) 
        
Public Ownership (PO) -4.578 -1.752    -4.988 -1.863 
  (1.279) (0.716)    (1.347) (0.736) 
Barriers to Entry (BTE)    0.568 0.112 1.460 0.358 
     (0.743) (0.446) (0.796) (0.464) 
           
Trend*Telecom 0.319 0.837 0.250 0.754 0.327 0.842 
  (0.531) (0.233) (0.540) (0.231) (0.529) (0.235) 
Trend*Electricity 0.950 0.809 0.781 0.727 0.828 0.776 
  (0.459) (0.196) (0.491) (0.201) (0.468) (0.200) 
           
Fixed Effects (54) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country Dummies (18) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (20) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 873 873 873 873 873 873 
 
NOTES:- All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; coefficients are from separate OLS 
regressions with Newey-West standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients) corrected for first 
order serial correlation. The sample is pooled across three industries (Electricity/Gas, 
Telecommunications/Post and Transport). “Share” is the labor share of value added. We include a full 
set of time dummies and time trends interacted with industry dummies (the base trend is 
Trend*Transport).  
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Table 5: Results Separately by Industry 
 
Panel A: Labor Share of Value Added 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Sector Electricity and Gas Telecom and Post Transport 
        
        
Public Ownership (PO) 0.512 0.427 1.927 
  (0.379) (1.186) (0.524) 
Barriers to Entry (BTE) -0.785 -0.858 0.060 
  (0.486) (0.536) (0.231) 
        
Country Dummies (18) Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (24) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 372 268 302 
 
Panel B: ln(Employment) 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Sector Electricity and Gas Telecom and Post Transport 
        
        
Public Ownership (PO) 6.324 1.749 0.577 
  (1.604) (1.199) (1.743) 
Barriers to Entry (BTE) 1.621 1.086 0.468 
  (1.247) (0.781) (0.871) 
        
Country Dummies (19) Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (20) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 372 328 370 
 
Panel C: ln(Wages) 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Sector Electricity and Gas Telecom and Post Transport 
        
        
Public Ownership (PO) -3.371 -2.451 1.074 
  (0.888) (2.289) (1.202) 
Barriers to Entry (BTE) 0.050 0.787 -0.238 
  (0.699) (0.962) (0.853) 
        
Country Dummies (19) Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (20) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 319 257 211 
 
NOTES:- Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; these are coefficients and standard 
errors (in brackets) for separate OLS regressions for each specified industry. The Newey-West standard 
errors (in parentheses under coefficients) are corrected for first order serial correlation. We include a 
full set of time dummies and fixed effects (country dummies in this case) in all regressions.  
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Table 6: Quantification of the Role of Privatisation in Changing Labour’s Share 
in the Network Industries, 1980-98  
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Country Actual ∆PO αPO ∗∆PO Proportion ∆BTE αΒΤΕ∗∆ΒΤΕ 
    Change in Share     [3]/[1]     
            
Austria  -0.062 -0.750 -0.008 0.122 -2.424 0.012 
            
France  -0.018 -1.053 -0.011 0.589 -2.250 0.011 
            
Germany (1991-98) -0.057 -0.898 -0.009 0.156 -2.580 0.013 
            
Italy  -0.269 -1.873 -0.019 0.070 -1.885 0.009 
            
Netherlands  -0.143 -1.645 -0.016 0.115 -3.112 0.015 
            
Spain  -0.085 -1.523 -0.015 0.179 -1.990 0.010 
            
USA  -0.094 -0.173 -0.002 0.018 -1.440 0.007 
            
United Kingdom  -0.084 -4.747 -0.047 0.563 -2.063 0.010 
            
            
Unweighted Average -0.102 -1.583 -0.016 0.227 -2.218 0.011 
 
 
NOTES:- These are calculations taken over 1980-1998 using actual empirical changes in shares, BTE 
(Barriers to Entry index) and PO (Public Ownership). Coefficients are taken from Table 4 Panel A 
column 6 (-0.005 on BTE and 0.009 on PO). Although there are more countries included in the 
analysis, here we report the results for the countries for which we have a consistent set of data from 
1980-1998.  
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Table 7: Role of Labour Market Institutions (Union Density) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
            
Dependent variable Share Ln(Employment) Ln(Wage) 
          
Public Ownership (PO) 1.037 1.055 -15.404 3.476 -2.492 -1.351 
  (0.471) (0.373) (3.096) (1.115) (1.594) (0.705) 
Barriers to Entry (BTE) -0.764 -0.834 3.961 -0.322 2.638 0.107 
  (0.313) (0.248) (1.459) (0.561) (0.788) (0.430) 
Union Density 1.517 -0.478 -64.211 -2.623 -2.134 -26.791 
  (1.658) (3.147) (11.118) (4.937) (7.337) (5.950) 
           
Trend*Telecom -0.782 -0.767 1.453 -0.541 -0.643 1.106 
  (0.189) (0.134) (0.936) (0.177) (0.672) (0.195) 
Trend*Electricity 0.012 0.055 0.986 -0.653 0.385 1.300 
  (0.152) (0.098) (0.909) (0.220) (0.569) 80.181) 
           
Fixed Effects  No Yes(46) No Yes(49) No Yes(46) 
Country Dummies  (17) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (20) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 792 792 838 838 723 723 
 
NOTES:- All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. The coefficients are from separate 
OLS regressions. The sample is pooled across three industries (electricity/gas, telecom/post and 
transport). “Share” is the Labor Share of Value Added. We include a full set of time dummies and time 
trends interacted with industry dummies (the base trend is Trend*Transport). The Newey-West 
standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients) are corrected for first order serial correlation.  
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Table 8: Labor Share Regressions – Instrumental Variable Estimates 
 
  [1] [2] [3] 
  OLS First Stage OLS IV 
Dependent variable Labor Share Public Ownership Labor Share 
       
(lagged) Positioning on the political scale    -27.580   
 (from most left=1 to most right=10)   (5.554)   
(lagged) right-wing party in power   -9.468   
    (3.030)   
Public Ownership (PO) 0.883  6.031 
  (0.345)  (1.967) 
Barriers to Entry (BTE) -0.506 12.160 -1.095 
  (0.251) (3.127) (0.356) 
       
Trend*Telecom -0.748 4.105 -0.972 
  (0.110) (0.961) (0.159) 
Trend*Electricity -0.033 2.507 -0.148 
  (0.092) (1.125) (0.123) 
       
F-Statistic (p-value of excluded IVs)   12.7   
Fixed Effects (53) Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (23) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 910 910 910 
 
NOTES:- These regressions estimate instrumental variable versions of the labor share regressions using 
socio-political variables as instruments for public ownership. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
The Newey-West standard errors are corrected for first order serial correlation. 
  44
 
Table 9: Robustness of Pooled Results - Including additional controls from a 
more general production function 
 
          
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Dependent variable Labor Share Labor Share Labor Share Labor Share 
          
Public Ownership  0.987 1.029 1.086 1.323 0.796 0.829 0.922 1.132 
  (0.365) (0.390) (0.354) (0.351) (0.359) (0.359) (0.391) (0.411) 
Barriers to Entry  -0.823 -0.874 -0.752 -0.628 -0.480 -0.499 -0.986 -0.893 
  (0.223) (0.225) (0.201) (0.195) (0.304) (0.297) (0.282) (0.294) 
Ln(Capital-Output)  -3.986        -2.657 
   (1.494)        (1.629) 
Ln(TFP)     6.659     4.488 
      (1.744)     (2.067) 
Labour Conflict Rate        1.238  -0.997 
         (1.649)  (1.630) 
              
Trend*Telecom -0.693 -0.692 -0.693 -0.702 -0.800 -0.796 -0.712 -0.721 
  0.116 0.116 0.114 0.115 0.125 0.126 0.138 0.141 
Trend*Electricity 0.101 0.145 0.126 0.262 -0.037 -0.041 0.110 0.225 
  0.082 0.079 0.074 0.068 0.097 0.098 0.095 0.095 
              
Fixed Effects  35 35 42 42 48 48 30 30 
Time Dummies (24)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 664 664 774 774 848 848 568 568 
 
NOTES:- All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; coefficients are from separate OLS 
regressions with Newey-West standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients) correct for first order 
serial correlation. The sample is pooled across three industries (Electricity/gas, 
Telecommunications/Post and Transport). “Share” is the Labor Share of Value Added. We include a 
full set of time dummies and time trends interacted with industry dummies (the base trend is 
Trend*Transport). The Capital, Output and TFP variables are constructed from the OCED International 
Sectoral Data Base (ISDB) 1996. The Labour Conflict Rate variable is constructed from the CEP-
OECD Dataset, documented in Bell and Dryden, 1996.  
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Figure 1: Change in the Aggregate labor share across OECD Countries 
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NOTES:- These are country level values of labor’s share of value added. All OECD countries, 1980-
2000. Each circle represents a different country (25 countries).  
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Figure 2: Decompositions of the changes in the aggregate  
labor share of value added, 1980-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES:- This figure is a graphical representation of the results in Table 3. All aggregate changes are 
broken down into “within industry” and “between industry” components across four broad sectors 
(Network Industries, Manufacturing, Finance, and Wholesale/Retail/Hotels). The contributions of the 
Within Network Industry and between manufacturing components are shown as these tend to be the 
largest components. The decomposition uses equation (20). 
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Figure 3: Change in the labor share across OECD Countries for Network 
Industries 
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NOTES:- These are country level values of the labor share of value added in the network industries 
only (OECD countries, 1980-2000). Each circle represents a different country (25 countries). 
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Figure 4: Average Public Ownership Index Across OECD Countries for Network 
Industries 
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NOTES:-  These are country level averages of the public ownership index for the Network Industries 
only (OECD countries 1980-1998). The Public Ownership Index is drawn from the OECD’s regulation 
database (Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000, 2003a, b). Each circle represents a different country (19 
countries). 
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Figure 5: Average Barriers to Entry Index Across OECD Countries for Network 
Industries 
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NOTES:-  These are country level averages of the public ownership index for the Network Industries 
only (OECD countries 1980-1998). The Barriers to Entry (BTE) index is drawn from the OECD’s 
regulation database (Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000, 2003a,b). Each circle represents a different country 
(19 countries). 
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Table A1: Balance of Panel by Country and Industry 
 
Country 
Electricity 
and Gas 
Post and 
Telecom Transport Total 
          
Australia  32 22 22 76 
Austria  26 26 26 78 
Belgium  16 17 17 50 
Canada  30 20 20 70 
Denmark  32 32 32 96 
Finland  32 27 27 86 
France  31 23 23 77 
Germany  11 10 10 31 
Greece  7 7 7 21 
Italy  32 22 22 76 
Japan  32 19 19 70 
Netherlands  32 22 22 76 
Norway  32 11 11 54 
Portugal  23 16 16 55 
Spain  17 15 15 47 
Sweden  30 20 20 70 
USA  32 32 32 96 
United 
Kingdom  31 9 9 49 
          
Total 478 350 350 1178 
 
 
NOTES: This is the unrestricted sample without controlling for missing values in share, employment 
and wages. 
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Table A2: Change in the labor share, 1980-2000 
 
 
Change 
in 
Business 
Sector Network Industries Manufacturing Wholesale, Retail & Hotels Financial Share 
Country   SHARE  VA  Within Between SHARE  VA  Within Between SHARE  VA  Within Between SHARE  VA  Within  Between 
                        
Austria -4.02 62.53 16.98 -0.27 -0.37 62.55 40.02 -5.77 -1.89 55.41 30.94 3.42 0.29 49.80 12.06 -0.96 1.54 
                      
France -5.60 56.25 17.08 0.32 0.21 63.31 46.74 -3.45 -5.65 67.36 26.26 -2.10 4.00 60.60 9.92 -0.52 1.58 
                      
Germany -1.85 57.17 16.01 -1.91 0.04 71.87 50.81 -0.54 -4.33 68.57 24.35 0.18 3.15 66.03 8.84 0.65 0.91 
                      
Italy -6.22 59.19 15.03 -4.08 2.41 64.63 44.84 0.22 -5.90 66.25 29.38 -0.88 2.41 52.56 10.75 -1.15 0.75 
                      
Netherlands -7.02 53.38 17.63 -1.02 -0.21 61.67 39.10 -3.89 -3.53 58.99 31.66 -1.07 2.11 58.21 11.61 -0.89 1.47 
                      
Spain -4.37 46.90 17.22 -1.16 1.23 62.19 42.09 0.12 -8.42 38.93 31.48 0.46 3.66 59.10 9.21 -1.16 0.89 
                      
USA -8.83 56.48 18.63 -1.23 -0.20 70.67 38.31 -2.91 -6.54 70.37 31.18 -0.96 1.46 54.33 11.88 -2.54 4.09 
                      
United Kingdom -4.34 61.27 17.97 -1.57 1.55 74.41 43.35 -2.42 -8.31 66.97 27.52 -1.75 6.26 50.79 11.15 2.27 -0.36 
                      
Unweighted Mean -5.28 56.64 17.07 -1.36 0.58 66.41 43.16 -2.33 -5.57 61.61 29.10 -0.34 2.92 56.43 10.68 -0.54 1.36 
 
NOTES:- Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; 
_
SHARE  is the average labor share (for each sector) between 1980 and 2000 and 
_
VA  is the average value 
added (for each sector) between 1980 and 2000. The data from Gronnigen Industry Productivity Database. The decomposition is based on equation (20 in the text.
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Table A3: Aggregate Union and Employment Protection Measures 
 
  [1] [2] [2] [3] 
        
Dependent variable Labor Share Labor Share 
      
Public Ownership 1.488 0.683 1.382 0.733 
  (0.440) (0.401) (0.523) (0.421) 
Barriers to Entry -0.531 -0.684 -0.701 -0.791 
  (0.331) (0.261) (0.352) (0.271) 
Union Density    0.785 6.061 
     (1.923) (5.287) 
Employment Protection -6.491 -2.277 -5.548 0.609 
  (1.249) (3.316) (1.428) (4.069) 
        
Trend*Telecom -0.822 -0.784 -0.852 -0.790 
  (0.200) (0.124) (0.216) (0.136) 
Trend*Electricity -0.068 -0.005 -0.062 0.034 
  (0.162) (0.099) (0.172) (0.102) 
        
Fixed Effects (50) No Yes No Yes 
Time Dummies (21) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 789 789 789 789 
 
NOTES:- Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; Employment Protection measures are 
drawn from the OECD (Nickell et al (2002)). The base trend is Trend*Transport. The Newey-West 
standard errors correct for first order serial correlation. 
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Table A4: Dynamic Specification   
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
  SHARE Ln(Emp) Ln(Wages) SHARE Ln(Emp) Ln(Wages) 
              
              
Public Ownership 0.961 2.266 -1.382       
  (0.589) (1.008) (1.263)       
Lagged PO -0.063 0.991 -0.554 0.816 3.117 -1.803 
  (0.578) (1.261) (1.255) (0.349) (1.133) (0.742) 
Barriers to Entry -0.403 0.437 0.312       
  (0.347) (0.671) (0.607)       
Lagged BTE  -0.108 0.214 0.051 -0.452 0.558 0.312 
  (0.357) (0.704) (0.590) (0.261) (0.620) (0.462) 
              
Trend*Telecom -0.749 -0.268 0.845 -0.746 -0.270 0.840 
  (0.109) (0.156) (0.236) (0.109) (0.156) (0.236) 
Trend*Electricity -0.039 -0.709 0.777 -0.043 -0.682 0.776 
  (0.093) (0.213) (0.201) (0.092) (0.212) (0.201) 
              
Fixed Effects  54 57 54 54 57 54 
Time Dummies  24 20 20 24 20 20 
Observations 923 1064 870 923 1064 870 
 
 
 
NOTES:- All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. The coefficients are from separate 
OLS regressions. The sample is pooled across three industries (electricity/gas, telecom and transport). 
“Share” is the Labor  Share of Value Added. The base trend is Trend*Transport. The Newey-West 
standard errors are corrected for first order serial correlation. 
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Table A5: Robustness of pooled results  
 Restricting sample to non-missing on all variables  
 
        
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Dependent variable Labor Share Ln(Employment) Ln(Wage) 
        
Public Ownership 1.252 1.054 -9.153 2.967 -5.076 -1.874 
  (0.405) (0.361) (2.427) (1.191) (1.332) (0.741) 
Barriers to Entry -0.405 -0.379 -0.568 0.865 0.519 0.453 
  (0.294) (0.262) (1.276) (0.632) (0.753) (0.468) 
           
Trend*Telecom -0.768 -0.728 -0.004 -0.555 0.051 0.736 
  (0.174) (0.110) (0.832) (0.174) (0.521) (0.236) 
Trend*Electricity -0.053 -0.074 -0.444 -1.075 0.560 0.664 
  (0.179) (0.112) (0.821) (0.242) (0.454) (0.202) 
           
Fixed Effects (54) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country Dummies (18) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies (20)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 861 861 861 861 861 861 
 
NOTES:- The specification is identical to that in column (5) and (6) of Table 3 except we restrict the 
sample to observations where we have no missing values on the labor share, ln(emp) and ln(wage). 
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Table A6: Robustness of Pooled Results: Including Country Trend Interactions 
 
 
    
  [1] [2] [3] 
Dependent variable Wage Bill Share 
    
Public Ownership 0.898 0.602 0.750 
  (0.339) (0.425) (0.360) 
Barriers to Entry -0.495 -0.487 -0.452 
  (0.246) (0.213) (0.206) 
      
Trend*Telecom -0.773 -0.776 -0.731 
  (0.108) (0.095) (0.090) 
Trend*Electricity -0.037 -0.002 -0.064 
  (0.089) (0.079) (0.091) 
Trend*Manufacturing   -0.054 
    (0.083) 
      
Fixed Effects  54 54 80 
Country*Trend No Yes Yes 
Time Dummies  24 24 24 
Observations 944 944 1304 
 
 
 
 
NOTES:- All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; coefficients are from separate OLS 
regressions with Newey-West standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients) correct for first order 
serial correlation. The sample is pooled across four industries (electricity/gas, telecommunications/post, 
transport and manufacturing). The manufacturing industry is an average over nine categories specified 
in the STAN dataset (food, textiles, wood, pulp, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, basic metals, metal 
products, machinery). “Share” is the Wage Bill Share of Value Added. We include a full set of time 
dummies and time trends interacted with industry dummies (the base trend is Trend*Transport).  
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